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ABSTRACT
Current trends in technology scaling foreshadow worsening tran-
sistor reliability as well as greater numbers of transistors in each
system. Thecombination of these factors willsoon make long-term
product reliability extremely difﬁcult in complex modern systems
such as systems on a chip (SoC) and chip multiprocessor (CMP)
designs, where even a single device failure can cause fatal system
errors. Resiliency to device failure will be a necessary condition at
future technology nodes. In this work, we present a network-on-
chip (NoC) routing algorithm to boost the robustness in intercon-
nect networks, by reconﬁguring them to avoid faulty components
while maintaining connectivity and correct operation. This dis-
tributed algorithm can be implemented in hardware with less than
300 gates per network router. Experimental results over a broad
range of 2D-mesh and 2D-torus networks demonstrate 99.99% re-
liability on average when 10% of the interconnect links have failed.
1. INTRODUCTION
As the semiconductor industry moves further into the nanome-
ter regime, two salient problems arise: efﬁciently connecting the
increasing number of on-chip resources and effectively managing
decreasing transistor reliability. Current methods of connecting on-
chip resources, such as buses and crossbars, may soon be precluded
by the delay of long wires and the large number of elements that
must communicate with each other. Networks on Chip (NoC) help
mitigate this problem by decentralizing and distributing commu-
nication across the chip using a lightweight networking protocol,
resulting in a high throughput, scalable solution.
NoCs use a shared interconnect system to transmit packets of in-
formation between intellectual property components (IP, e.g., pro-
cessor cores, caches, ASICs, etc.) through a distributed system
of routers connected by links. Data sent through the network is
converted into a packet, a formatted block of data, by a network
adapter. Each packet is then labeled and divided into a sequence
of uniformly sized ﬂow units (ﬂits) and sent from the adapter to a
router [2], from where it travels from router to router through the
network.
While the NoC approach has been increasing in popularity with
commercial chips such as Tile64 [1] and Polaris [19], it is threat-
ened by the decreasing reliability of aggressively scaled transistors.
Transistors are approaching the fundamental limits of scaling, with
gate widths nearing the molecular scale, resulting in break down
and wear out in end products [10]. Permanent faults due to device
wearout are caused by mechanisms such as negative bias temper-
ature instability (NBTI), oxide breakdown, and electromigration.
These device level failures have architecture level ramiﬁcations, as
a single faulty link or router will cause an entire NoC to fail, halt-
ing all trafﬁc. Future processor technology generations will require
signiﬁcant error tolerance to many simultaneous faults.
On-chip networks provide excellent opportunities for building a
reliable system, as they provide redundant paths between IPs [18].
As the “glue” that holds a chip together, a NoC should be highly re-
silient to hardware failures and able to work around faulty routers
and links. In contrast, a faulty IP with even little or no protec-
tion can be disabled and isolated by the network, thus promoting
NoC as a reliable system platform. A disabled IP would not hin-
der network performance, as the associated router can still be used.
An ideal network should be able to diagnose where faults are in
its own components and then reconﬁgure to mitigate those faults,
maintaining full connectivity when possible. To avoid single points
of failure, thereconﬁguration processshould bedistributedand per-
formed within the network itself.
1.1 Contribution of This Work
We present a distributed routing algorithm for networks on chip,
allowing a network to reconﬁgure around faulty components. Our
solution’s novelty lies in its ability to overcome large numbers of
faults in a ﬁne-grained fault model without using virtual channels
or adaptive routing, and in a distributed nature, which avoids single
points of failure. Given only local information, the algorithm runs
in lockstep at each network router to collectively reconﬁgure the
network’s routing tables. Using ahardware implementation ismore
reliable as it may be unknown what IPs are safe for routing com-
putation, and a software implementation would still require some
degree of hardware support. The algorithm is implemented with
less than 300 gates at each router, thus making it a low-overhead
approach for both simple designs (even those without virtual chan-
nels) as wellas complex ones. Wefound that networks routed using
this algorithm are 99.99% reliable when 10% of the interconnect
links have failed.
2. RELATED WORK
Our work adopts the turn model originally proposed by Glass
and Ni for adaptively routed networks in [6], which prevents net-
work deadlock by disallowing various network turns. Later, in [7],
they showed how the technique can be applied to n-mesh networks
totolerate(n-1) routerfailures (1router failurefor2D-mesh). Their
strategyusesnovirtualchannelsbut requiresadaptiverouting, whereas
our work requires neither. Additionally we are not limited to any
particular number of failures.
Jie Wu uses the odd-even turn model to address convex, dis-
joint fault regions that do not lie on the mesh boundary [20]. Al-
though his technique does not require virtual channels, the fault-
requirements are strict. The work we present has no requirements
on the fault patterns.
A series of other works present solutions to adaptively route
around router fault regions while enduring various restrictions and
requirements [3, 4, 5, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22]. Packets are routed
normally until encountering a fault region, and are then transmit-
ted along the edge of that region. Initially, only rectangular, dis-
connected, non boundary regions could be tolerated while requir-
ing a large number of virtual channels. Sometimes fully functional
routers had to be disabled to meet the shape requirements. Recent
work extends these techniques to router failures of arbitrary pat-
terns using as few as two virtual channels. These additional virtual
channels do not add to the performance of the system, however,
as they are reserved for fault tolerance. Our work requires no vir-Figure 1: NoC router. When a packet enters the router, its header
isdecoded and thedestination islooked up inthe routing table. The
packet is then transmitted in the direction speciﬁed in the routing
table. Our algorithm rewrites this table when faults appear in the
network.
tual channels reserved for fault tolerance, so any virtual channels
added to the system add to performance. Moreover, our work al-
lows link-level failures and does not require adaptive routing, nor
do we disable functional routers.
Ho and Stockmeyer present a strategy that disables the IPs con-
nected to a few sacriﬁcial lamb routers, which helps prevent dead-
lock [9]. They demonstrate high reliability for a small number of
faulty routers (3%), which is suitable for their application in the
Blue Gene supercomputer. Our work targets reliability at higher
failure rates while not disabling resources.
Other approaches use additional virtual channels combined with
adaptive routingtoprovidefault tolerance. Pruenteet al.[12] present
a technique that tolerates link-level failures using a relatively com-
plicated algorithm and two virtual channels (one reserved for fault
tolerance), while Gomez et al.[8] are able to tolerate up to ﬁve link
failures with the addition of one virtual channel.
In contrast with previous work, our solution requires no virtual
channels, no adaptive routing, no particular fault restrictions, and
no disabled routers. Many these works provide 100% reliability
when conditions are met - while our technique can not guarantee
that, experimental results show over 99.99% reliability when up
to 10% of interconnect links have failed. Moreover, we provide
hardware implementation results proving the feasibility of our ap-
proach.
3. ROUTING ALGORITHM OVERVIEW
The routing algorithm presented in this paper reconﬁgures net-
work routing tables in an ofﬂine process. It consists of a basic
routing step and a number of rule checking steps. The rules con-
strain the basic routing step depending on the network topology
and existing faults in order to safely redirect trafﬁc around failed
network resources, while the checks determine which rules to use.
The algorithm is speciﬁcally designed for deterministically routed
on-chip networks in SoC and CMP applications. Each router in our
network contains a routing table (Figure 1), which lists an output
port for each destination in the network. Packets traversing the net-
work have a header ﬂit with a destination ID ﬁeld that is used to
look up what direction to go at each router. Virtual channels are
not required, but could be used to provide additional performance.
The algorithm is implemented as a small hardware module in each
router that runs in a distributed lock-step fashion.
We model faults as link-level hard failures, thus each bidirec-
tional link can be individually bypassed, allowing routers to be
only partially functional. An entirely non-functional router is rep-
1: function main () {
2: foreach (rule) {
2: foreach (router) {
3: run_rule_check(rule, router)
4: }
5: }
6: foreach (dest) {
7: run_basic_routing_step(rules, dest)
8: }
9: }
10:
11: function run_basic_routing_step (rules, dest) {
12: if (dest == self) {
13: write_entry(‘‘local’’)
14: } else {
15: write_entry(‘‘invalid’’)
16: }
17: for num_router cycles {
18: if entry != ‘‘invalid’’ {
19: transmit_flags(rules)
20: } else {
21: check_for_flags(rules)
22: write_entry(priority_flag)
23: }
24: }
Figure 2: Pseudocode for rerouting algorithm. The function
run basic routing stepwilloftenbereusedbyrun rule check.
resented by marking all four of its links as faulty. No restriction on
the number or location of faulty links is assumed, but the routers
must know which of their adjacent links are faulty. Each router
works withitsneighbors tocollectively reconﬁgure theirrouting ta-
bles based only on this information. In addition, it is assumed that
the routers know when they need to invoke the algorithm and how
toresume operation afterreconﬁguration ﬁnishes. Failuredetection
and diagnosis, computation checkpointing, etc., aretopics that have
been extensively explored in other work [15] and are not discussed
in this paper. The algorithm is comprised of multiple iterations of a
basic routing step – a procedure that updates an entry in all routing
tables for a particular destination. In the remainder of this section
we describe the basic routing step as well rules to constrain it. We
later show how to use these rules for speciﬁc topologies, 2D-mesh
and 2D-torus, in Sections 4 and 5 respectively.
3.1 Basic Routing Step
The basic routing step is shown in the second half of Figure
2. Each router selects the best direction to route a given destina-
tion based on information provided by its neighbors, then updates
the corresponding entry in its routing table. Routers communicate
through ﬂags – one-bit signals transmitted to adjacent routers. At
any point during the execution of the algorithm, entries in a rout-
ing table are marked either valid, if the corresponding destination
is known to be reachable, or invalid otherwise. In the valid case
the entry also contains the direction that packets must take to reach
that destination.
To determine the best path to the destination, all routers start by
initializing the corresponding entry to invalid, except for the router
connected to the destination locally. This router marks the entry as
valid, and the proper direction in the table (Entry Initialization).
All routers then repeat the following two steps until every router
has had an opportunity to update its entry:
1. Flag transmission. During the ﬂag transmission step, all
routers whose destination entry is valid will send a ﬂag to all
of their adjacent routers. The other routers are silent.Figure 3: Example of six iterations of the algorithm’s basic step. The only rule enforced disallows the Northeast corner turns, so the
Southwest routers must go around the East side of the faulty link. “D” denotes the destination being routed, “!” denotes routers that wrote a
valid entry that step, and “¬” denotes places where a turn rule prevented a ﬂag from propagating.
2. Routing entry update. In this step, all routers who have
(i) an invalid routing entry for the destination under analysis
and (ii) have received a ﬂag through any of their links in the
previous step, update their entry to valid with the direction
of the incoming ﬂag. If a router has received a ﬂag through
multiple links, a priority selection procedure is used to select
the preferred routing direction. If a router has not received
any ﬂag, or already has a valid entry, it does not take any
action.
Each panel of Figure 3 shows a single iteration of the basic rout-
ing step for a 3x3 mesh network. For an N router network, the
routing steps above must berepeated N−1timestocover the worst
case scenario, where the routers are connected as a long chain. At
the end of this process, if the router still has an invalid entry for
the destination under analysis, then that destination is unreachable
from that router.
3.2 Rules for the Basic Routing Step
To avoid deadlock loops forming while performing the basic
routing step, each router must also keep a set of rules – a list of
disallowed links and turns.
Links can be disallowed in the basic routing step by not transmit-
ting ﬂags across them, or by not accepting transmitted ﬂags. There-
fore a link can be disallowed by either router that it connects.
Turns comprised of a path through two links connected by a router
must be disallowed by their center router. The center router can
disallow a turn between two links by not transmitting ﬂags from
one to the other, i.e., if its valid entry points to the second link, it
will not transmit ﬂags to the ﬁrst link.
These sets of rules are determined on a per-router basis depend-
ing on both the topology of the network and the present faults. In
our subsequent examples of 2D-mesh and 2D-torus networks, we
reuse the basic routing step to evaluate which rules are necessary
to avoid deadlock. Each router will start with a set of default rules,
removing or adjusting them based on the set of faulty links.
4. 2D-MESH ROUTING
2D-mesh is a common network topology for large scale chip
multiprocessors due to its simple physical implementation. In this
section we ﬁrst discuss the natural loops that form in a mesh, and
the rules required to prevent them. We then investigate situations
when rules at individual routers need to be removed to maintain
connectivity. Finally, we discuss a pathological case, as well as its
solution. An example of mesh routing is provided in Figure 3.
Figure 4: Disallowing turns to avoid deadlock. Three examples
are shown routing the same set of packets on the left, and the
turns that they use on the right. Top row shows how the basic
routing step will perform with no rules and no faults - no deadlock
loops appear in the turn graph. The center row shows how routing
the same packets results forms a deadlock loop when a fault is
present. All packets take the only other available 2-hop route, and
use overlapping resources which will eventually conﬂict with each
other indeﬁnitely. The third row shows how we disallow a turn
to make one packet to take a longer path around the fault (green),
which prevents a deadlock loop. “¬” denotes places where a turn
rule prevented a ﬂag from propagating.
4.1 2D-Mesh Rules
A fault-free 2D-mesh network routed according to our algorithm
will be deadlock-free without enforcement of any rules since S-E-
W-N priority leaves the Northwest and Northeast corners naturally
unused (Figure 4, ﬁrst row). However, a single fault in the net-
work may cause a deadlock loop to form (Figure 4, second row).
Deadlock occurs when a loop of utilized turns is formed. The basic
routing step naturally uses minimal length paths, and every turn in
the loop around the fault is the minimal length path between the
two routers that it connects, thereby creating deadlock.
Glass and Ni show that disallowing a pair of turns in an adaptive
routing network prevents deadlock situations [6]. One turn must be
disallowed for the clockwise direction, and another for the counter-
clockwise direction. In our experience, the best results were ob-
tained when both the clockwise and counter-clockwise turns at the
same corner were disallowed. An example of how disallowing a
pair turns removes deadlock is shown in the bottom row of Figure
4.
InourexampleswechoosetodisallowtheNortheastcornerturns,
which are North→East and East→North.Figure 5: Selectively removing rules to allow full network con-
nectivity. Strict adherence to the disallowed turn rule may result
in a case where some routers are not able to reach the Northwest
destination, although possible paths exist (left). This occurs be-
cause the routers on the western edge have the East→North turn
disabled to avoid deadlock. Therefore, we remove the turn rule at
theWestrouter, restoringnetworkconnectivity(right). “D”denotes
the destination being routed and “/” denotes routers unable to reach
the destination.
4.2 Selectively Removing 2D-Mesh Rules
Strict adherence to disallowed the turn rule may produce an in-
consistent network, where consistency means that if one router can
reach another then a return path also exists. In Figure 5, a sin-
gle faulty horizontal link on the North edge of the network pre-
vents six of the routers from obtaining a valid path to the North-
west router. All of the routers on the West edge of the network can
reach thisrouter by directing trafﬁc tothe North, however, since the
East→North turn is disallowed, these fringe routers never transmit
a ﬂag to the East, cutting off the rest of the routers.
In order to prevent this scenario we must identify routers where
the turn rules should be removed to maintain a consistent network.
To do this, we must check each corner by trying route from one
end of the corner to the other using the basic routing step. If this
cannot be successfully accomplished with the disallowed turn, then
the corner turns must be allowed to maintain network consistency
and both turns for the corner are then allowed. The center router
knows if the corner was successfully routed based on the ﬂags that
it receives from the two other routers. We check one corner router
at a time, so the minimal number of rules are removed in sequence.
If this were not done then both fringe routers would have theirturns
allowed and the second faulty link in the example would cause a
deadlock.
4.3 Pathological Case
A pathological case infrequently arises in large networks with
many faults. As shown in Figure 6, deadlock loops can form when
two subnetworks are connected by a router with the turn rule re-
moved. Effectively, the deadlock loop passes through the connect-
ing router twice, as if folded over a point. We reduce this problem
by using a routing priority that disfavors a different corner - in our
example we use S-E-W-Npriority to disfavor the Northwest corner.
The pathological case can still appear if there isa single fault inside
of each of the subnetworks, since the Northwest turns will still be
used in that case, similar to the second row of Figure 4. We address
this by formally disallowing a different corner for one of the sub-
networks. Once we have changed which corner is being disallowed
for this part of the network via a directed broadcast, we must check
each of these new rules.
Thepattern can also repeat inside one side fora largenetwork, so
we allow the turn to be changed back to the original turn when new
rules need to be removed. This part of the algorithm can loop by
changing between these two corners as long as it needs. Any router
that does not have its corner rule modiﬁed becomes “ﬁxed”, and
Figure6: Pathologicalcaseforlargenetworkswithmanyfaults.
The corner rule for the Southwest router was removed as desired,
but a deadlock loop forms by passing through that router twice. We
adjust the rules for one side to break the loop.
is no longer changeable so that forward progress is made. In our
implementation we switch between the Northeast and Northwest
corners, broadcasting the corner-change signal to the East/North
and North/West respectively.
5. 2D-TORUS ROUTING
Tori are very similar to meshes so we start with the same rules
described inour2D-meshexample. Uniquechallenges forthebasic
routing step(described inSection3.1) arepresent, since atorusnet-
work automatically forms deadlock loops even in absence of faults.
5.1 2D-Torus Rules
Torus networks form loops around the outside of the network
by continuing in the same direction until reaching the same router
again. We address these loops with the addition of link rules. We
ﬁrst disallow all wrap-around links along the top edge of the net-
work, then disallow one horizontal link in each row of the network.
The horizontal links prevent a loop from forming in the same row.
The vertical link rules along the North edge prevent a zigzagging
pattern from looping around the network, as well as loops that
would form in the same column. We choose a staggered pattern
for the horizontal links in order maintain the performance provided
by the torus topology.
Each of these new rules (vertical link and horizontal link) needs
to be checked, as shown in the ﬁrst part of Figure 2. Horizontal
link rules can be checked ﬁrst, and all in parallel. If there is a
broken link in the same row as a horizontal link rule then it is not
necessary to have the rule since the broken link provides the same
beneﬁts. Wecan accomplish thischeck withahorizontal broadcast,
where knowledge of broken links propagates horizontally and lifts
any horizontal link rules. Since this broadcast starts at the ends of
each broken link it is guaranteed to reach every router in the row.
Vertical link rules can be checked similarly to the corner rules.
One side of the link maintains the rule - we route the other side of
the link and check if this side ever has a valid entry. If it does not
then the link is needed for consistency and the rule is discarded.
The horizontal and vertical rules only need to be checked once,
regardless of whether the corner rules are changed or not. They are
put in place to create a network that can be successfully routed by
manipulating the corner rules.
5.2 Corner Rule Consistency
The 2D-torus topology adds the possibility of corner evaluation
being inconsistent. Each corner has two turns, so the corner could
be evaluated by routing one turn or the other. Meshes are always
consistent, i.e., routing either turn yields the same result (routable
or unroutable). Tori can be inconsistent in some cases since pathsaround the outside of the network may be blocked off when routing
one turn versus another. Thisoftenhappens when one of therouters
connected by the turn is reachable only through the center router.
When theotherconnected routeristhedestination, the ﬁrstrouteris
not able to reach it since the center router always routes directly to
the destination, which blocks off all possibilities for the ﬁrst router.
When the ﬁrst router is the destination, however, the second router
may ﬁnd a path around the outside of the network, which is an
option that would not be available in a 2D-mesh network.
Removing this turn rule would allow a deadlock path in the net-
work, but not allowing it would create an inconsistent network. We
resolve this by applying a ﬁx-up to this turn in the form of a new
link rule. Whichever connected routercould not ﬁndtheother iscut
off by the center router, therefore disallowing the link to the other
router will not cut off any part of the network. This forces both
connected routers to take the path around the outside of the net-
work to reach the other, and keeps the network consistent while not
allowing deadlock. Since this rule is only added when it is needed,
it doesn’t need a rule check.
5.3 2D-Torus Optimization
The link rules imposed for tori disallows more turns than neces-
sary since they in effect disallow two sets of turns, one set for each
connected router. We can limit this rule to only one set by ignor-
ing the rule when the destination is on either side of the link. If
we cross a disallowed link to reach a destination then we must also
ignore the turn rule for that router in order to maintain network
consistency. This allows us to more efﬁciently use the 2D-torus
topology without incurring deadlock or consistency problems.
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluated our algorithm on a number of 2D mesh and torus
network sizes, ranging from 4x4 to 12x12 (Table 1). These sizes
are representative of current industrial designs such as Tile64 (8x8)
[1] and Polaris (10x8) [19]. Using a cycle-accurate simulator writ-
ten in C++, each router was modeled as a single cycle design with
16-ﬂit input FIFOs. Stimulus was produced with a constrained-
random trafﬁc generator with each packets being 8 ﬂits long. We
modeled faults as link-level failures, which allowed for a high de-
greeof ﬂexibility,sincerouterscanretainpartialfunctionalitywhen
experiencing faulty sub-components.
Table 1: Networks topologies and sizes used for evaluation.
2D-Mesh 4x4 24 links 2D-Torus 4x4 32 links
8x8 112 links 8x8 128 links
12x12 264 links 12x12 288 links
6.1 Reliability Analysis
In our ﬁrst study, we explore the relationship between the num-
ber of faulty links and the reliability of the network. We randomly
inject a number of unique link faults into various network topolo-
gies. After injecting the faults and allowing the network to recon-
ﬁgure, we inspect the resulting tables to verify that the following
properties hold true:
• No deadlock condition is present: no set of turns used in
routing the network form a ring (see Figure 4).
• Routing tables are consistent: if router A has a valid entry for
router B, then A and B have the same set of valid entries.
• No routers are unnecessarily cut off: if adjacent routers A
and B are connected by a non-faulty link, then each have a
valid entry for the other.
Werepeatedtheexperiment onemilliontimesforeachdatapoint,
obtaining the results shown in Figure 7. As shown in the chart, all
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Figure 7: Reliability with increasing faults. All topologies were
found to be at least 99.99% reliable at the 10% point.
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network conﬁgurations exhibit a reliability over 99.99% when a
tenth of the links are faulty. Smaller 4x4 networks had 100% relia-
bility for 2D-mesh, and 99.99999% reliability for 2D-torus, regard-
less of the number of faulty links. With larger networks however,
the probability of a faulty network conﬁguration increased as the
number of faults increased beyond this point, although reliability
in real implementations would be much higher, since errors tend to
exhibit spatial locality (temperature, utilization, clock distribution,
etc.).
6.2 Performance Evaluation
In our second study, we investigated the effects of link failures
on the performance of the network. Speciﬁcally, we measured the
average latency of packets traversing the network as the density of
randomly generated trafﬁc increased. Density is shown as a per-0 10 20 30 40
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Figure 9: Network trafﬁc saturation. The amount of trafﬁc
that a network can support before it reaches the latency wall for a
given number of faults. The median trafﬁc density is used for this
calculation.
centage of the total injection bandwidth of the system, which is
ﬁxed and proportional to the number of routers in the network.
Figure 8 shows the result of this analysis for an 8x8 2D-torus
network. For low trafﬁc densities, the latency is kept under 20 cy-
cles, however, as the density increases, network saturation occurs,
resulting in a latency wall. With injected faults, the latency wall is
reached at lowertrafﬁcdensities, as indicated by thegraph. Inaddi-
tion, random faultinjection createsvariationintheonset of network
saturation, shown by the shaded region (5th to 95th percentile).
In our next experiment we further investigate the relationship be-
tween the number of broken links and the location of the latency
wall, analyzing multiple network conﬁgurations. Here, we vary
the number of broken links and record the trafﬁc density at which
the latency wall (70-80 cycle latency) is encountered. Each data
point represent 5000 tests of 50,000 packets. The results shown in
Figure 9 demonstrate that with an increasing failure rate, network
saturation occurs at progressively lower trafﬁc densities. This can
be attributed to fewer operational paths available for communica-
tion among network routers, as well as longer routes around failed
network components.
6.3 Area Evaluation
Finally, weevaluated theareaimpactof implementingourrerout-
ing solution in hardware. We implemented the 2D-torus variant of
the algorithm as a Verilog module, and synthesized it with Synop-
sys Design Compiler and a state-of-the-art 45nm library. The over-
head of implementing the algorithm in a 4x4 network was less than
300 gates per router. For comparison, a 12x12 network requires
an additional 30 gates, attributed to slightly larger state machine
counters.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have presented a general fault tolerant routing
algorithm targetingNoC designs implemented on unreliable silicon
as foreseen for future technology nodes. We also discuss speciﬁc
implementations of the algorithm for 2D-mesh and 2D-torus net-
works. Our solution routes around network failures by leveraging
redundancy inherent in NoC topologies while not incurring virtual
channel costs. At less than 300 gates per router, this approach is an
efﬁcient and effective addition to either simple or complex router
designs. Experimental results showed an average reliability of over
99.99% when 10% of the network links have failed across a variety
of networks sizes. Our routing algorithm enables the deployment
of NoC architectures and systems where network connectivity and
correctness must be maintained possibly at a performance cost, en-
abling graceful performance degradation as network resources fail.
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